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there.1 Introduction
Modern welfare states have contributed to the solution of a number of potentially serious social
and economical problems.1 Economic scholars studying the welfare state often discuss disincen-
tive eﬀects of welfare arrangements, and of the taxes to ﬁnance them, on economic behavior,
which may create new problems (Lindbeck, 1995a; Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 2003; Hen-
rekson and Persson, 2004). The basic dilemma of the welfare state is attributed to the direct
eﬀect of more generous beneﬁts on the number of recipients. This eﬀect operates through three
diﬀerent channels: tax distortions, moral hazard and beneﬁt fraud.
Tax wedges do not only distort relative prices in favor of leisure and against work, but also
increase the attractiveness of household production and black-market labor. Moral hazard is
often a more serious problem. While tax wedges usually result in adjustments on the intensive
margin (fewer hours of work), moral hazard often leads to adjustment on the extensive margin
at least for a period of time. The complete withdrawal from the labor market can be observed
in the case of unemployment insurance, sick-pay insurance or early retirement (Lindbeck, 2008).
Higher taxes and more generous beneﬁts also create incentives to invest less in human capital
(Boskin, 1974) and to save less for the ‘rainy days’ (Lindbeck, 1995a). There is also considerable
evidence of explicit beneﬁt fraud. Beneﬁt fraud seem to be particularly pervasive in the case of
social beneﬁts, sick beneﬁts, and unemployment beneﬁts.2
Lindbeck (1995a,b); Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (2003) point out that it is necessary to
discuss the disincentive eﬀect of welfare arrangements in the context of a dynamic interaction
between market behavior and political behavior over time. It is hypothesized that individuals
do not respond to changes in such economic incentives immediately, since they are constrained
by social norms (Elster, 1989) for some time. Therefore, the disincentive eﬀects may materialize
only with considerable time lags. In particular, theoretical models predict that the strength of
the norm is expected to fall with the share of the population living on beneﬁts (Lindbeck, Nyberg
and Weibull, 1999) and parents’ incentives to instill such norms in their children should fall as
the generosity of the welfare state increases (Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006).
The theoretical literature rests upon testable assumptions and oﬀers concrete hypotheses on
welfare-state dynamics involving endogenous changes in social norms and political preferences.
However, little is known about the empirical validity of these assumptions and hypotheses. The
empirical research in this area is still in an early stage. Lindbeck (2003) states that ‘theory and
speculation are far ahead of systematic empirical research in the ﬁeld of welfare-state dynamics’.
This fact is surprising since there is a widespread concern about abuse and dishonesty in social
welfare programs.
1For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Persson and Tabellini (1994) provide empirical evidence that income
inequality is harmful for growth.
2Greenberg, Moﬃtt and Friedman (1981); Greenberg and Halsey (1982) study transfer programs (negative-
income tax plans) in the United States and ﬁnd substantial income underreporting for up to 50 percent of certain
subgroups of the population. Skogman Thoursie (2004) provides empirical evidence for abuse of the sickness
insurance system in Sweden by comparing the change between the number of men and women who report sick
during popular sporting events. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach shows that the number of men who reported
sick increases considerably in order to watch the sporting event on television. Kingston, Burgess and St. Louis
(1986) identify frequent overpayments in unemployment insurance systems of ﬁve US states, indicating that many
claimants falsely certify that they have actively sought a job. Wolf and Greenberg (1986) ﬁnd fraud rates of 2 to
4 percent in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps entitlement programs.
2Our paper is intended to contribute to the empirical research in the ﬁeld of welfare-state
dynamics. We are interested in the dynamic eﬀect of diﬀerent welfare arrangements on beneﬁt
fraud. In particular, we analyze the impact of the welfare state on the respective social norm,
called beneﬁt morale. Beneﬁt morale captures the individual reluctance to exploit the welfare
state via beneﬁt fraud.
There are few papers on beneﬁt morale, both empirical and theoretical. Algan and Cahuc
(2008) study the impact of beneﬁt morale on the design of public insurance policies within the
labor markets. They incorporate beneﬁt morale into a model in which unemployment beneﬁts
and job protection are shaped by a government that maximizes a social welfare function. This
model shows that the government provides low unemployment beneﬁts if beneﬁt morale is low. In
this case, the government provides insurance by using a less eﬃcient institution-employment pro-
tection. Therefore, low levels of beneﬁt morale impede the implementation of eﬃcient insurance
institutions. Accordingly, they provide empirical evidence that countries displaying high beneﬁt
morale tend to insure their workers through unemployment beneﬁts instead of using stringent
employment protection.
Halla and Schneider (2008) contrast the determinants of beneﬁt morale with the determinants
of tax morale – the social norm to abstain from cheating on the state via tax evasion – in order
to explore diﬀerences between beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion. Their empirical analysis shows
that both social norms evolve endogenously and are determined by prices (i.e. the cost of acting
morally). Citizens who have comparably more opportunities and low cost to commit a certain
oﬀense, develop the attitude that it is a minor oﬀense. This suggests that citizens excuse or
rationalize their own deviant behavior. Moreover, they analyze the impact of current ﬁscal
policy measures on these social norms. Their results show that both social norms deteriorate
with higher tax rates, however, they improve with current higher public social expenditures.
Most closely related to our research is Heinemann (2008). His paper is the ﬁrst attempt to
empirically test the hypotheses on the dynamic relation of the welfare state and social norms
provided by theory. He explores whether the expansion of the welfare state over time has led to
lower levels of beneﬁt morale. His analysis puts forward that an increase in social beneﬁts and
in the unemployment rate over the preceding twenty years is associated with substantially lower
levels of beneﬁt morale today. Moreover, he claims that later birth cohorts have signiﬁcantly
lower levels of beneﬁt morale whereas age has no eﬀect.
In this paper we use a large micro data set from the European and World Values Survey,
combined with information from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) to provide a systematic analysis of the dynamic eﬀects of welfare state arrangements on
beneﬁt morale. Based on the theoretical literature we derive testable hypotheses on the eﬀect of
the generosity of the welfare state and the share of the population living on beneﬁts on beneﬁt
morale over time. For the ﬁrst time we provide empirical evidence that a generous welfare state
and a large share of the population living on beneﬁts have very diﬀerent short, medium, and
long run eﬀects. A high level of public social expenditures and a large number of unemployed
in the current period have small positive (or no) short run eﬀects on beneﬁt morale, however,
these are crowded out by adverse medium and long run eﬀects. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the hypothesis that disincentive eﬀects of a generous welfare state materialize only with some
3time lag.
Further, we demonstrate the absolute importance of controlling for country ﬁxed-eﬀects for
this type of analysis. The generosity of the welfare state is correlated with unobserved country-
speciﬁc time-invariant heterogeneity in a way that disregarding country ﬁxed-eﬀects can diamet-
rically reverse results. In sharp contrast to Heinemann (2008) we can not support the hypothesis
of the degeneration of younger cohorts’ beneﬁt morale. Once the problem of linear dependency
among age, period and cohort is adequately addressed this eﬀect vanishes.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section2 we derive testable hypotheses on the dynamic
eﬀects of the welfare state and beneﬁt morale. Section3 highlights several methodological prob-
lems to overcome in order to test these hypotheses. Our estimation strategy is presented in
Section4. The estimation results are discussed in Section5, and Section6 concludes the paper.
The Data appendix provides all details on data sources and deﬁnitions.
2 Hypotheses on welfare state dynamics and beneﬁt morale
Does the supply of a welfare state create its own demand? Many economic scholars studying
welfare arrangements refer to Say’s law and insinuate a self-destructive welfare state. The the-
oretical literature (e.g. Lindbeck, 1995a,b, 2003) emphasizes that it is necessary to account for
social norms and to discuss the consequences of welfare state arrangements in a dynamic con-
text. This should reﬂect the interacting adjustment of basic behavior patterns of households,
ﬁrms, interest-groups, politicians and public-sector administrators over time. The fundamental
supposition is that individuals do not respond to changes in economic incentives immediately,
since they are constrained by social norms for some time. Individuals are assumed to experience
disutility when violating social norms. This can be explained by intrinsic factors, a subjectively
felt resistance to violate social norms, or extrinsic factors such as a loss of reputation possibly
accompanied by punishment. Put diﬀerently, new incentives created by the welfare state are in
conﬂict with existing social norms. However, as time evolves individuals gradually stop obeying
initially existing norms and disincentive eﬀects may materialize with considerable time lags.
In this paper we are interested in a particular channel, namely the role of beneﬁt fraud in the
hypothesis of hazardous welfare state dynamics. We want to test these dynamic eﬀects of the
extent of the welfare state on the social norm with respect to beneﬁt fraud empirically. To mea-
sure the individual reluctance to exploit the welfare state via beneﬁt fraud (i.e. beneﬁt morale)
we employ large scale international survey data. This data allows us to test whether beneﬁt
morale evolves in response to diﬀerent welfare state arrangements as presumed and predicted by
the theoretical literature.
If the fundamental supposition of Lindbeck (1995a,b) applies we should observe that gen-
erous welfare payments in preceding periods reduce beneﬁt morale today. In order to test this
supposition we need to quantify the generosity of the welfare state. The OECD Social Expen-
diture Database summarizes information on aggregated public social expenditure grouped along
nine core social policy areas: old-age, survivors, incapacity-related beneﬁts, health, family, ac-
tive labor market policies, unemployment, housing and other social policy areas. In 2003, public
social expenditures accounted – averaged across OECD-member countries in our sample – for
21.54 percent of the gross domestic product. As expected, public social expenditures are highest
4among Scandinavian and Benelux countries and are relatively low among Anglo-Saxon countries
(see Table4). This data allows us to measure the level of aggregate public social expenditure on
an internationally comparable base and we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: High levels of public social expenditures over time decrease beneﬁt
morale.
A central part of our main empirical analysis in Section5 is devoted to the modeling of the
correct dynamic eﬀects of the extent of the welfare state on beneﬁt morale.
Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) constitute a related explanation why disincentive eﬀects
of generous welfare arrangements are likely to be stronger in the long than in the short run. They
hypothesize that the level of beneﬁt morale tends to fall with the number of individuals living
on beneﬁts, in the sense that the guilt or shame connected with breaking the social norms is
then reduced. In other words, the authors take the existence of beneﬁt morale as given and
endogenize the intensity of this social norm.
In their theoretical model the individual ﬁrst expresses his political preferences with respect to
the government’s tax and beneﬁt policies as a voter. Thereby, he anticipates the consequences of
the chosen policy for his own subsequent economic choice and for aggregate behavior. Secondly,
the individual has the choice of whether to work or to live solely on beneﬁts. Utility is maximized
subject to after-tax wage, the level of beneﬁts, and the expected population share of beneﬁt
recipients. Under the assumption that individuals do not diﬀer in their sensitivity to the social
norm there is a critical wage rate that separates individuals choosing to work and individuals
choosing to live on beneﬁts. This results either in a low-tax equilibrium supported by a majority
of taxpayers or in a high-tax equilibrium supported by a majority of beneﬁt recipients. Under the
alternative assumption of heterogeneous preferences there exists a critical value of beneﬁt morale
that separates individuals. Therefore, at some point of time a society may ﬂip from one type
of economic-political equilibrium to the other. For instance, a severe negative macroeconomic
shock may cause a large share of the population living on beneﬁts and it may be diﬃcult to get
a political majority for less generous beneﬁts.
While it is diﬃcult to test all aspects of this model, we focus on the fundamental assumption
that a large share of population receiving welfare beneﬁts weakens the social norm to respect
welfare arrangements and abstain from exploiting the system. In order to quantify the population
share living on beneﬁts, we use the unemployment rate. While the unemployment rate is not
the only possible choice, it distinguishes itself from other measures by its wide availability and
comparability across countries. Again, we focus on the dynamic eﬀects of unemployment on
beneﬁt morale and state:
Hypothesis 2: High levels of unemployment over time decrease beneﬁt morale.
Another hypothesis is that changes in social norms are particularly likely to occur when a new
generation enters working life and forms its norms on the basis of a new incentive structure
(Lindbeck, 1995a, p.11). This means, that individuals who are born at diﬀerent stages of the
welfare state exhibit diﬀerent initial levels of beneﬁt morale. Since the welfare state in all OECD
member countries has been expanding on average over the last decades3, one could hypothesize
3In 1980, public social expenditures accounted – averaged across OECD-member countries in our sample – for
17.31 percent of the gross domestic product. In 2003, this value has increased to 21.54 percent (see Table4).
5that younger birth cohorts should have a lower level of beneﬁt morale:
Hypothesis 3: Younger birth cohorts have a lower level of beneﬁt morale.
While the test of this hypothesis is a legitimate stand-alone empirical research question, it is
indispensable to control for time-related variation in beneﬁt morale in order to test Hypothesis
1 and 2. A sensible test of these hypotheses has to consider the possibility that changes in
the levels of public social expenditure and unemployment rates are correlated with time-related
variation in beneﬁt morale.
In order to provide empirical evidence for Hypothesis 3 one has to go one step further and
disentangle diﬀerent types of time-related variation in beneﬁt morale. In particular, the eﬀect
of age, period and birth cohort. This is complicated by the identiﬁcation problem created by
the exact linear dependency among age, period and cohort (Mason, Mason, Winsborough and
Poole, 1973).
3 Methodological issues
In this section we discuss several methodological challenges to overcome in order to test Hypothe-
ses 1 to 3. To highlight the relative importance of diﬀerent econometric issues we analyze the
robustness of earlier ﬁndings. Heinemann (2008) tests straightforward variants of Hypotheses 1
and 2, where he employs the change in social beneﬁts and the change in the unemployment rate
over the preceding twenty years. To test Hypotheses 3 he includes the respondent’s year of birth
as an explanatory variable.4
In Section4 we will suggest a reﬁned econometric framework which is used to present our
own empirical results based on a new and extended data set in Section5. Our empirical model
allows, among others, public social expenditures and the level of unemployment to have varying
eﬀects on beneﬁt morale in the short, medium and long run. This more ﬂexible modeling reveals
interesting dynamic eﬀects of welfare arrangements on beneﬁt morale. Moreover, we will show
that that if one carefully disentangles the eﬀects of age, period and birth cohorts the result
implying a morally corrupt youth disappears.
3.1 Data on beneﬁt morale
To our best knowledge there are two alternative data sources5 to study the phenomenon of
beneﬁt morale, the European and World Values Surveys (E/WVS) and the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP).6 We have decided to employ data from to E/WVS for two reasons.
First, since all previous papers on beneﬁt morale have used data from E/WVS, this provides the
4All estimations discussed in Section3 are based on the data set employed by Heinemann (2008). We would
like to thank Prof. Heinemann for providing us with the data.
5In fact, the European Social Survey asks, ‘Suppose you planned to get beneﬁts or services you were not entitled
to. How many of your friends or relatives do you think you could ask for support?’. However, this question is
not aimed to capture the individual moral motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via beneﬁt fraud, but
should rather measure the (perceived) beneﬁt morale among the respondent’s circle of friends and acquaintances.
6The ISSP questionnaire includes in the year 1991 and 1998 the following question: ‘Consider the [following]
situation [...]. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government incorrect information about
himself or herself to get government beneﬁts that he or she is not entitled to?’. The scale of answers ranges from
1 ‘not wrong’, to 4 ‘seriously wrong’. The 2008 questionnaire does not include this question anymore.
6comparability of results to some extent. Second, the E/WVS covers substantially more countries
and years than the ISSP.
The E/WVS is an ongoing academic project organized as a network of social scientists coordi-
nated by a central body, the World Values Survey Association. These surveys provide data from
representative national samples (based on face-to-face interviews) of more than 80 countries. It
contains information on basic attitudes, beliefs and human values covering religion, morality,
politics, work and leisure. To date, four waves have been conducted in 1981−1984, 1990−1993,
1995−1997, and 1999−2004. The exact question on beneﬁt morale in the E/WVS questionnaire
reads as follows:
‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be
justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed, or something in between: Claiming governments beneﬁts
to which you are not entitled.’
Respondents are asked to evaluate on an ordered scale from ‘never justiﬁable’ (1) to ‘always
justiﬁable’ (10). We use this question to construct our measure of beneﬁt morale.
3.2 Measurement of beneﬁt morale
The original question in the E/WVS questionnaire gives a measure of beneﬁt morale on a ten-
point scale. Heinemann (2008); Algan and Cahuc (2008) use a re-scaled version of this measure
as a dependent variable, and a explanatory variable, respectively. They create a binary measure
which takes on the value one if the respondent answers ‘never justiﬁable’ in the E/WVS, and
zero otherwise. The authors argue that the re-scaling should ease the interpretation of results.
However, this mapping from the ordered scale into a binary variable seems arbitrary. This
speciﬁc mapping groups together respondents with the highest level of beneﬁt morale and all
other respondents. That means, this binary measure does not capture a variation from the
lowest level of beneﬁt morale (the answer ‘always justiﬁable’) to considerably higher level of
beneﬁt morale such as the answer ‘nine’.
We think that the most innocuous procedure is to stick to the original ten-point scale provided
by the E/WVS questionnaire but to reverse the scaling such that a higher value of the variable
also indicates a higher level of beneﬁt morale.7 This measure makes use of the whole variation
and has a straight forward interpretation.
In order to explore the sensitivity of the results with respect to mapping from the ordered
scale into a binary variable we compare the results for both variables based on the preferred
speciﬁcations of Heinemann (2008).8 If we switch from the binary measure of beneﬁt morale to
the ordinal variable no qualitative changes can be observed with respect to Hypothesis 1 to 3
7The reversed scaling does only change the sign of the coeﬃcient in a regression analysis but leaves the absolute
value unchanged.
8Heinemann (2008) employs one set of speciﬁcations to test his version of Hypothesis 1 and another set
to test his version of Hypothesis 2. Both sets are intended to test Hypothesis 3. Our speciﬁcation Ia and Ib
in Table1 correspond with Heinemann’s speciﬁcation (3) in Table3a and speciﬁcation (4) in Table3b, but we
exclude ﬁve country-level control variables (ethical fractionalization, latitude, legal origin, tax decentralization
and autonomous regions). We disregard these control variables, since they interfere with country-ﬁxed eﬀects
to be discussed in Section3.4. However, the exclusion of these control variables does not change the qualitative
results.
7(compare columns Ia and IIa, and columns Ib and IIb in Table1).9 However, the control variable
income turns out to be a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of beneﬁt morale. Although there
are no further substantial diﬀerences between the results obtained from the two diﬀerent versions,
we cannot ﬁnd any argument in favor of reducing the full ten-point measure of beneﬁt morale
which is available in the underlying data.
3.3 Time-related variation in beneﬁt morale
In order to test Hypothesis 3 thoroughly one has to disentangle the eﬀects of age, period, and
birth cohorts. Age eﬀects represent variation associated with diﬀerent age groups brought about
by experience of life (e.g. accumulation of social capital), physiological changes and/or role or
status changes. Period eﬀects are deﬁned as variation over time periods that aﬀect all age groups
simultaneously. These may result from from shifts in political, social or economical environments.
Birth cohort eﬀects represent changes across groups of individuals born in the same year (Ryder,
1965). A birth cohort moves through life together and encounters the same historical and social
events at the same ages.
Since the sum of a person’s age and his birth year is equal to the current year (i.e. the year
of the survey), there exists an exact linear relationship between these variables. Put diﬀerently,
one of the variables is an exact linear combination of the two others, and a general linear model
cannot be used to identify all three eﬀects. An extensive literature across disciplines discusses
how to identify these three eﬀects with diﬀerent types of data and in diﬀerent settings (see, e.g.,
Mason, Mason, Winsborough and Poole, 1973; Glenn, 1976; Mason, Mason and Winsborough,
1976; Fienberg and Mason, 1979, 1985; Sasaki and Suzuki, 1987; Glenn, 1989; Robertson, Gandini
and Boyle, 1999).
The E/WVS collects information on both age and year of birth. The year of the survey
should be equal to the sum of the respondent’s age and his birth year. Unfortunately, there are
many cases of age and/or year of birth misreporting in the data.10 A border line case is given by
observations where the sum of the respondent’s age and his birth year is by one lower or higher
than the survey year. The ﬁrst case may occur if the interview took place before the respondent’s
birthday in the given year.11 The second case may occur if the survey lasted until the beginning of
the next year and the interview took place after the respondent’s birthday.12 Since the available
survey data do not provide information on the month of birth or on the month of the interview,
it is not possible to deﬁnitely distinguish between observations that naturally deviate by one and
corrupted observations. However, an auxiliary regression analysis provides evidence that that
the majority of these deviations is due to the timing of interview and birthday rather than errors
in the data.13 Throughout all our estimations we kept these observations, however, disregarded
9The correlation between the two measurements of beneﬁt morale is about 0.74.
10This type of misreporting has several potential sources. Mason and Cope (1987) mention (i) ignorance about
age, (ii) distortion of age to meet preconceptions about the relationship of age to other characteristics or events,
(iii) communication problems between interviewers and respondent, and (iv) errors of recording or processing.
11Note, only for the interviews conducted in the year 1999 the month of the interview is availabale. In all other
cases only information on the month when the ﬁeld work has started and ended is provided.
12In these cases, the survey year is assumed to be the preceding year, since the majority of interviews took
place then.
13A simply estimation, regressing a binary variable – taking on the value 1 if the the deviation from age, period
and cohorts is either zero or minus one – on the month when the ﬁeld work has started/ended (which varies across
8all observations with strictly impossible combinations of respondents’ age and year of birth.
Heinemann (2008) neither addresses the observations with strictly impossible combinations
of respondents’ age and year of birth, nor the identiﬁcation problem of age, period and birth
cohort eﬀects. His identiﬁcation of birth cohort eﬀects rests apparently upon variation from (i)
strictly impossible combinations of respondents’ age and year of birth, (ii) the speciﬁc timing of
interview and birthday, and (iii) the omission of period eﬀects.
In columns IIIa and IIIb in Table1 we augment our regressions by period ﬁxed eﬀects and
we see that the statistically signiﬁcant negative impact of the year of birth (i.e. the birth
cohort eﬀect) disappears in both speciﬁcations. In any case, this result has to be interpreted
with caution too, since the identiﬁcation is solely due to the small deviations resulting from the
speciﬁc timing of interview and birthday. In Section4, we will employ a cross-classiﬁed ﬁxed-
eﬀects model developed for micro-level data in the form of repeated cross-sections (Yang and
Land, 2006; Yang, 2008; Yang and Land, 2008) to cleanly identify the eﬀect of birth cohorts.
3.4 Unobserved country time-invariant heterogeneity
In order to test Hypothesis 1 to 3 it is indispensable to control for unobserved country time-
invariant heterogeneity.14 This especially applies to Hypothesis 1 and 2 where the variables of
main interest are measured on a country-level. Given that one never can be sure that all relevant
control variables are included, an estimation without country ﬁxed-eﬀects is less convincing, since
unobservable factors may be correlated with the variables of main interest.
The importance of country ﬁxed-eﬀects can easily be demonstrated. If we augment speciﬁca-
tions IIIa and IIIb with country ﬁxed eﬀects, neither the coeﬃcient of the measure of the size of
the welfare state (see columns IVa in Table1), nor of the unemployment rate (see column IVb in
Table1) exerts any statistical signiﬁcance. This suggest that both variables are correlated with
unobserved factors.15 Therefore, we will control for country-ﬁxed in all our speciﬁcations below.
3.5 Socio-economic control variables
Heinemann (2008) controls for the following socio-economic characteristics: age, sex, family sta-
tus, labor market status and household income. We think that this basic set of socio-economic
control variables should be augmented by any measure of educational attainment.16 The level
of educational attainment is correlated with the level of public social expenditures, the unem-
ployment rate and the birth cohort. Not controlling for educational attainment could result in
omitted variable bias and misleading conclusions with respect to Hypothesis 1 to 3. Moreover, we
suggest a more detailed speciﬁcation of labor market status and split up the status non-employed
in ‘unemployed’ and ‘out of labor force’ and compare them to the base group of employed indi-
countries and years) shows that the earlier ﬁeldwork has started the more likely there will be a deviation from a
perfect linear relation between age, period and cohort.
14In principal, one would prefer to control for unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity. However,
best to our knowledge there is no panel data on beneﬁt morale available.
15Heinemann (2008) includes ﬁve country-level control variables (ethical fractionalization, latitude, legal ori-
gin, tax decentralization and autonomous regions) which eﬀectively groups together countries and mitigates the
omission of country-ﬁxed eﬀects to some degree.
16To capture the respondents’ level of educational attainment we use the school leaving age. For detailed
information please refer to the Data appendix.
9viduals. Finally, we suggest including two additional control variables; the number of children
and the size of the place of residence.
This augmented speciﬁcation of socio-economic control variables provides additional insights,
see speciﬁcations Va and Vb in Table1. The level of education exerts a positive and the size
of the place of residence a negative statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. Further, it
becomes clear that the negative impact of non-employment is mainly due to unemployment, and
only to a lesser extent due to being out of the labor force.
3.6 Attitudinal control variables
Finally, there are a number of attitudinal variables for which one could easily put forward a hy-
pothesis on their interrelation to beneﬁt morale. For instance, consider national pride/patriotism.17
Social psychologists (e.g. Tyler, 2000) reasonably argue that national pride has an important
role in shaping deference to authorities. People who feel pride in society and in its authorities
are more likely to obey those authorities and to accept their decisions. Accordingly, we expect
more patriotic citizens to exhibit a higher level of beneﬁt morale.
Is it therefore advisable to control for individual national pride when we test Hypotheses
1 to 3? In our view, it can be misleading to control for attitudinal control variables. For
instance, individual patriotism may also be inﬂuenced by public social spending. Conditioning
on it would tamper with that part of the causal eﬀect of a public social spending on beneﬁt
morale that operates through patriotism. If we would add more attitudinal control variables we
would eliminate further potential channels through which public social spending aﬀects beneﬁt
morale. Moreover, we would not gain any further insights if we ﬁnd evidence that certain
attitudinal control variables are statistically signiﬁcant determinants of beneﬁt morale. Firstly,
these coeﬃcients could only be interpreted as correlations. In each case, one has to suspect a
simultaneity bias. For instance, we would not only expect that more patriotic citizens have a
higher level of beneﬁt morale, but also vice versa, meaning that citizens with a high beneﬁt
morale exhibit higher levels of national pride. Finally, these attitudinal variables are not easily
amenable to policy interventions.
In any case, speciﬁcation V Ia and V Ib in Table1 show that the exclusion of measures of
patriotism, religiosity and conﬁdence in parliament does not change the qualitative results. We
consequently abstract from attitudinal control variables in the following empirical analysis.
17Other attitudinal variables are trust in a country’s institutions, such as the government, the parliament or
the legal system.
104 Estimation strategy
In order to account for the methodological issues discussed above we estimate a cross-classiﬁed
ﬁxed-eﬀects model (Yang and Land, 2006),
BMi,j,c,t = α0 +
18 X
c=2

















θmincomei,j,c,t + ξX + πYεi,j,c,t,
(1)
where BMi,j,c,t stands for the beneﬁt morale of individual i, of birth cohort j, from country c in
period t. The information on beneﬁt morale is based on wave two to four of the E/WVS.18 After
cleaning the data we have information on more than 30,500 respondents from 18 OECD-member
countries for several years between 1990 and 2000 available (see Table2).19 An overview of the
the average level of beneﬁt morale across countries and years is given by Table3.
In order to test Hypothesis 1 we include the current and past levels of public social expendi-
tures measured as a percentage of GDP Sct derived from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.
To test Hypothesis 2 we examine the eﬀect of the current and past unemployment rates Uct on
beneﬁt morale.20 In order to disentangle the eﬀects of age, period and birth cohort (Hypothesis
3) we include age, age2, period ﬁxed eﬀects periodt and a series of binary variables cohortj
capturing 13 diﬀerent groups of birth cohorts as suggest by (Yang and Land, 2006).
In addition, we include on a country level macroeconomic control variables X (GDP per
capita and GDP-deﬂator from OECD sources) and on an individual level a set of socio-economic
control variables Y included in the E/WVS, comprising the respondent’s sex, marital status,
number of children, size of the place of residence, education (captured by the school leaving age),
labor market status (employed, self-employed, unemployed, out of labor force) and the household
income (measured on a ten-point scale).21 With respect to household income we suggest a very
ﬂexible speciﬁcation and include a binary variable for each income category incomei,j,c,t, where
the base group is equal to the group with lowest household income. This speciﬁcation does not
impose any functional form on the eﬀect of household income on beneﬁt morale.22 Finally, we
control for country ﬁxed-eﬀects countryc to allow for unobserved country-speciﬁc time-invariant
heterogeneity. All standard errors are clustered by country and year (Moulton, 1990).
Since beneﬁt morale is measured on a ten-point scale, it is strictly speaking an ordinal
measure, which requires an ordered response model (Wooldridge, 2002). Nevertheless, since
18In particular, we retrieved the data from the European and World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data
File, 1981 − 2004 and restricted our sample to respondents from OECD-member countries, since comparable
information on public social expenditures is not available for non-member countries. We could not exploit data
from the ﬁrst wave of the E/WVS since information on public social expenditures is not available before 1980.
19Among others we have delete 4,712 observations with strictly impossible combinations of respondents’ age
and year of birth.
20Table4 and 5 show the development of public social expenditures and unemployment rates for the countries
under consideration from 1980 to 2005.
21For details please refer to the Data appendix.
22Note, we have excluded 112 observations from our analysis with values of eleven for the household income,
since according to the E/WVS questionnaire this category does not exist. All these observations are from the
United States.
11the qualitative results turned out to be equivalent and the scale is rather large we will for the
ease of presentation focus on least squares throughout the paper.23
5 Estimation results
Our main estimation results are presented in Table6. In order to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 we
include the levels of public social spending and the unemployment rate in the current period,
with a lag of ﬁve years and with a lag of ten years. This speciﬁcation allows for diﬀerent short,
medium and long run eﬀects of both variables on beneﬁt morale. As column I shows, both a
higher level of public social spending and a higher unemployment rate in the current period have
a quantitatively small positive eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. An increase in public social spending
by one percentage point (sample mean is equal to 20.83 percent) of GDP is associated with an
increase in beneﬁt morale by about 0.03 points. An equivalent rise in the unemployment rate
(sample mean is equal to 7.52 percent) increases beneﬁt morale by about 0.06 points. These
positive eﬀects are contrary to what Hypothesis 1 and 2 predict. However, our estimates of the
lagged values show that after a certain period of time an adverse eﬀect of both variables kicks
in. In the case of public social spending we observe no medium run eﬀect, but a quantitatively
important negative long run eﬀect. An increase in public social spending by one percentage point
today is estimated to decrease beneﬁt morale by about 0.22 points ten years later. In the case
of the unemployment rate we observe a detrimental long run eﬀect of beneﬁt morale. According
to our estimation an increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage point decreases the
level of beneﬁt morale ten years later by about minus 0.09 points.
If we leave out the ﬁve year lag of both variables (see column II in Table6) the negative long
run eﬀect of a more pronounced welfare state remains present, though the eﬀect turns out to be
a bit smaller in both cases. Notably, due to the exclusion of the ﬁve year lag of both variables
the positive eﬀect of the current unemployment rate vanishes. The eﬀects of all other (control)
variables are robust due to this modiﬁcation. To test the robustness of our results we have
augmented our two speciﬁcations by GDP with a lag of ﬁve years and with a lag of ten years as
additional control variables, see columns III and IV in Table6. Comparing speciﬁcation II with
speciﬁcation IV we see that this extension has no impact on the qualitative results, however, it
tends to increase the estimates of the negative long run eﬀects. Similarly, we observe an increase
in all eﬀects in absolute terms in speciﬁcation III compared to speciﬁcation I. Moreover, the
adverse eﬀect of public social spending kicks in already in the medium run.
Of course the lag of ﬁve and ten years with respect to Hypothesis 1 and 2 is no natural choice,
however, it turned out to be the most robust speciﬁcation among all.24 Ideally, one would like
to estimate the eﬀect of lagged public social spending and unemployment for each year over the
preceding decade. This would allow us to trace out the full adjustment path of beneﬁt morale.
However, due to the small number of country-years this can not be implemented yet and one has
to wait for further waves of the E/WVS to be conducted.
In sum all our diﬀerent speciﬁcations suggest that both an increase in public social expendi-
23As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003); Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) the interpretation of nonlinear models
is quite cumbersome and not fully demonstrative.
24Notably, the results with respect to Hypothesis 3 (see below) are completely unaﬀected by these modiﬁcations.
12tures and a rise in unemployment have small positive short run (or no) eﬀects on beneﬁt morale.
These, however, are (partly) crowded out by adverse medium and long run eﬀects. In the case of
public social expenditures the negative medium and long run eﬀects clearly dominate the positive
eﬀect in the current period. This result is in line with the idea that individuals have to experience
generous welfare arrangements for quite some time until they adapt their social norm towards
accepting beneﬁt fraud, or at least considering it to be a minor oﬀence. We therefore, interpret
this as evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 and 2 and corroborate the theoretical literature which
suggests that disincentive eﬀect of welfare arrangements may materialize only with considerable
time lags. Our results also aﬃrm the basic empirical ﬁnding of Heinemann (2008), in the sense
that it boils down to a disincentive eﬀect of diﬀerent welfare arrangements on beneﬁt morale.
However, our analysis highlights that this relationship is characterized by a speciﬁc dynamic
structure which requires sensible econometric modeling.
Based on our cross-classiﬁed ﬁxed-eﬀects model we do not ﬁnd any evidence for birth cohort
eﬀects (Hypothesis 3). The four charts in Figure1 display the estimated coeﬃcients for the
birth cohorts eﬀects for the four diﬀerent speciﬁcations summarized in Table6 and show that for
each binary variable capturing a birth cohort group the 95 percent conﬁdence interval includes
the value zero. That means, none of the birth cohort group dummies is statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. This ﬁnding is very robust and holds across all speci-
ﬁcations. An equivalent analysis was also carried out using several other cohort structures (i.e.
other than the ﬁve-year groups). In any case, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of birth cohorts on
beneﬁt morale.
This result is in sharp contrast to Heinemann (2008) who ﬁnds that younger birth cohorts
tend to have lower values of beneﬁt morale. Our results show that if one carefully disentangles the
eﬀect of age, birth cohort, and period eﬀects the result of the morally corrupt youth disappears.
With respect to age we ﬁnd that beneﬁt morale increases with age. An additional year of age
is associated with an increase in beneﬁt morale by about 0.03 points. Encouragingly, we ﬁnd
an upward trend in beneﬁt morale over time (i.e. positive period eﬀects). As the four charts in
Figure2 show, beneﬁt morale has been increasing since the year 1990 (base category).
The results on the remaining individual socio-economic control variables are very robust
across diﬀerent speciﬁcations and are in accordance with our expectations. We ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of household income on beneﬁt morale. Our ﬂexible speciﬁcation – comprising a
binary variable for each income category – reveals that beneﬁt morale is lower among low-income
households (see Figure3). For instance, a household at the bottom of the income distribution
has about 0.40 points lower level of beneﬁt morale than a household at the top of the income
distribution. This result is in line with Halla and Schneider (2008) who argue that citizens
who have comparably more opportunities and low cost to commit a certain oﬀense, develop the
attitude that it is a minor oﬀense. Low-income household seem to excuse or rationalize their
own deviant behavior. Put diﬀerently, they self-servingly adjust their moral values. High-income
households have comparably less opportunities to commit beneﬁt fraud and consequently develop
and report the attitude that fraudulently collecting beneﬁts is wrong. Independent from income,
labor market status is an important determinant of beneﬁt morale. We ﬁnd that compared
to employed individuals, those who are unemployed have a much lower level of beneﬁt morale
13(about minus 0.39 points). Being self-employed or out of the labor-force yields (compared to
being employed) no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of beneﬁt morale.
Females exhibit a higher level of beneﬁt morale (about plus 0.17 points). This is in line
with the criminological literature showing that in general females have lower probabilities and
frequencies of committing criminal acts than males (e.g. Smith and Visher, 1980; Steﬀensmeier,
Anderson and Streifel, 1989; Elliot, 1994). The honest behavior of married people (about plus
0.18 points) can either be explained by a true causal eﬀect of marital status or by self-selection
into and/or out of marriage. Education has a small but statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
beneﬁt morale. An additional year of schooling increases the level of beneﬁt morale by about 0.01
points. Finally, the size of the place of residence is decisive. The bigger the place of residence
(captured by the number of inhabitants, measured on a three-point scale) the lower the level of
beneﬁt (about minus 0.07 points). This can be explained by a diﬀerent civic attitude in rural
areas as compared to large cities and a stronger corporate attitude in rural areas.25
6 Conclusions
Our ﬁndings corroborate the theoretical literature which assumes that disincentive eﬀects of a
generous welfare state materialize only with some time lag. In particular we show that a high level
of public social expenditures and a high unemployment rate are associated with small positive
(or no) immediate impact on beneﬁt morale, which is crowded out by adverse medium and long
run eﬀects. Therefore, negative macroeconomic shocks not only increase the share of population
living on beneﬁts per se, but in addition a deterioration of beneﬁt morale in the future has
to be expected. These dynamic disincentive eﬀects have not been empirically explored so far.
Our results are consistent with the fundamental supposition that individuals do not response
to changes in economic incentives immediately, since they are constrained by social norms for
some time. Essentially, our results suggest that the welfare state destroys its own (economic)
foundation and we have to approve the hypothesis of the self-destructive welfare state.
As is the case with all empirical research, our analysis presents some caveats due to limited
data. Firstly, in order to fully understand the dynamic and complex relationship between the
welfare state and beneﬁt morale more observations over time (i.e. a larger number of country-
years) are needed. And, secondly there are other measurements and dimensions of the welfare
state, which have a potential eﬀect on beneﬁt morale that has to be studied in order to fully
understand the whole phenomenon.
Assuming that the modern welfare state – according to Lindbeck (1995a, p.9) ‘a triumph of
western civilization’ – should be conserved, a clear, though hard to implement, policy implica-
tion follows. We need institutional designs which take these dynamic disincentive eﬀects into
consideration and aim to mitigate the hazardous feedback of (generous) welfare arrangements on
beneﬁt morale. In order to identify eﬃcient institutional arrangements, clearly more empirical
research on the determinants of beneﬁt morale is needed. We hope that this paper will stimulate
further research in this area. In any case, some disincentive eﬀects can be reduced by an inten-
siﬁed enforcement policy. Referring to the classical economics-of-crime approach (Becker, 1968)
25We also include the number of children as a control variable. However it exerts no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on beneﬁt morale.
14an increase in the probability of detection and a rise in the ﬁne rate should lower the incidence
of beneﬁt fraud.26
Encouragingly, we can not approve earlier studies putting forward that younger birth cohorts
have lower values of beneﬁt morale. We show that if one carefully disentangles the diﬀerent time-
related variation in beneﬁt morale the ﬁnding of the morally corrupt youth disappears. Further
we have identiﬁed a ceteris paribus increase in beneﬁt morale in our sample over time. Notably,
there are some indirect channels through which the welfare state may even improve beneﬁt
morale. For instance, higher public social expenditures may increase the level of educational
attainment, which in turn has a positive eﬀect on beneﬁt morale.
26The optimal deterrence policy is discussed by Kolm (1973).
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187 Data appendix
The information on the individual-level (control) variables beneﬁt morale, age, sex, marital
status (married or not), number of children, education (captured by the school leaving age),
size of place of residence (measured on a three-point scale), employment status (employed, self-
employed, unemployed and out of labor force) and household income (measured on a ten-point
scale) is based on wave two to four of the European and World Values Survey (E/WVS). In
particular, we retrieved the data from the European and World Values Surveys Four-wave In-
tegrated Data File, 1981 − 2004 and restricted our sample ﬁrst of all to all respondents from
OECD-member countries (except South Korea) for which information on these basic individual
characteristics was available and consistent. We have decided to exclude South Korea since no
information on labor market status was available.
A special comment is in order for the measurement of education. The E/WVS includes two
questions on education: ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ and (ii)
‘At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education?’. The former question
has considerably more missing response (49.87%) compared to the latter one (17.46%). In order
to exploit all the available information on education and to save observations we construct a
variable capturing the actual or the regular school leaving age. In particular, if information
on the second question was available we used it. In the cases where the answer on the second
question was missing, but information on the ﬁrst question was available we have imputed the
regular school leaving age of the respective educational level. We distinguished two cases: (i) If
there was information on both questions for other respondents from the same country and year
available, we have imputed the average school leaving age among those with the same highest
educational level attained. (ii) If there where no respondents from the same country and year
available with information on both questions we imputed the regular school living age of the
respective educational level. Full details are available upon request. Some respondents have
reported an unrealistically low or high school leaving age. We have decided to restrict the school
leaving age to be within the age of 10 and 28 and disregard 4,263 observations.
Our country-level (control) variables are from diﬀerent sources. As a measure for the
generosity of the welfare state we use data on public social expenditure measured as a per-
centage of GDP from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. An expenditure item is classiﬁed
as social if the beneﬁts are intended to address one or more social purposes, and if programmes
regulating the provision involve either inter-personal redistribution, or compulsory participation.
The OECD groups beneﬁts with a social purpose into nine policy areas: (i) old age (pensions,
early retirement pensions, home-help and residential services for the elderly), (ii) survivors (pen-
sions and funeral payments), (iii) incapacity-related beneﬁts (care services, disability beneﬁts,
beneﬁts accruing from occupational injury and accident legislation, employee sickness payments),
(iv) health (spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention), (v) family (child
allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during leave, sole parent payments),
(vi) active labor market policies (employment services, training, youth measures, subsidized
employment, employment measures for the disabled), (vii) unemployment (unemployment com-
pensation, severance payment, early retirement for labor market reasons), (viii) housing (housing
allowances and rent subsidies), and (ix) other social policy areas (non-categorical cash beneﬁts to
low-income households, other social services). For further details, refer to OECD (2007). Data
on the unemployment rate, the GDP per capita, and the GDP-deﬂator are based on the
OECD Factbook 2007.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 2: Number of available observations per country and year.a
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Totals
Australia 0 1,504 0 0 0 0 0 1,504
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 1,328 0 1,328
Canada 1,397 0 0 0 0 0 1,265 2,662
Denmark 766 0 0 0 0 796 0 1,562
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 642 642
France 0 0 0 0 0 1,126 0 1,126
Germany
b 3,056 0 0 1,490 0 1,366 0 5,912
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 650 0 650
Ireland 864 0 0 0 0 722 0 1,586
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1,180 0 1,180
Japan 639 788 0 0 0 0 986 2,413
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 488 0 488
Netherlands 667 0 0 0 0 802 0 1,469
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 924 0 0 924
Spain 0 747 0 0 0 638 683 2,068
Sweden 0 0 757 0 0 450 0 1,207
Great Britain 0 0 0 0 0 560 0 560
United States 1490 1030 0 0 0 781 0 3,301
8,879 4,069 757 1,490 924 10,887 3,576 30,582
a The estimations in Table6 are based on these observations.
b Values for Germany
are a combination of Western and Eastern Germany.
21Table 3: Beneﬁt morale across countries for available years.a
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Australia 9.41 9.41
Belgium 8.60 8.60
Canada 9.17 9.16 9.16




b 9.09 8.84 8.91 8.99
Greece 7.22 7.22
Ireland 9.08 9.21 9.14
Italy 9.20 9.20
Japan 9.17 8.95 8.94 9.01
Luxembourg 8.24 8.24
Netherlands 9.47 9.53 9.51
New Zealand 9.29 9.29
Spain 9.10 8.47 8.94 8.85
Sweden 8.93 9.07 8.98
Great Britain 8.98 8.98
United States 9.09 9.43 8.91 9.15
9.18 9.27 8.93 8.84 9.29 8.75 8.98 8.99
a Beneﬁt morale is measured on a ten-point scale based on the following question from
the E/WVS: ‘Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think
it always be justiﬁed (10), never be justiﬁed (1), or something in between: Claiming
governments beneﬁts to which you are not entitled.’. Our re-scaled measure of beneﬁt
morale is equal to 1 for the lowest level of beneﬁt morale (‘always justiﬁable’) and
equal to 10 for the highest level of beneﬁt morale (‘never justiﬁable’), i.e. higher
values indicate a higher level of average beneﬁt morale. The average values are based
on the set of observations per country and year displayed in Table2.
b Values for




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 6: Determinants of beneﬁt morale: Testing hypotheses 1 to 3.a
I II III IV
Hypothesis 1
Public social expend.t 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011)
Public social expend.t−5 0.021 -0.061***
(0.013) (0.015)
Public social expend.t−10 -0.221*** -0.120*** -0.365*** -0.178***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.009) (0.043)
Hypothesis 2
Unemployment ratet 0.063*** 0.010 0.258*** 0.068*
(0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.035)
Unemployment ratet−5 0.095*** 0.134***
(0.016) (0.007)
Unemployment ratet−10 -0.089*** -0.061*** -0.256*** -0.130***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.042)
Hypothesis 3
Birth cohort eﬀects
b yes yes yes yes
Country-level control variables
GDPt p.c. (in $100,000) -0.000 -0.006*** 0.030*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
GDPt−5 p.c. (in $100,000) -0.020***
(0.005)
GDPt−10 p.c. (in $100,000) -0.027*** -0.016*
(0.001) (0.008)
GDP deﬂator 0.310*** 0.185*** 0.305*** 0.199***
(0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026)
Period ﬁxed-eﬀects
c yes yes yes yes
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Individual-level control variables
Age 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age
2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.170***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Married 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.183*** 0.182***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
No. of children 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
School leaving age 0.013** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Town size -0.074** -0.074** -0.076** -0.074**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Self-employed
e -0.032 -0.036 -0.033 -0.036
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Out of labor force
e -0.017 -0.015 -0.018 -0.014
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Unemployed
e -0.390*** -0.388*** -0.393*** -0.388***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Income
d yes yes yes yes
Constant 8.043*** 9.437*** 9.698*** 10.048***
(0.583) (0.530) (0.734) (0.571)
Observations 30,582 30,582 30,582 30,582
R-squared 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.096
a The dependent variable is equal to beneﬁt morale measured on a ten-point scale,
where higher values indicate a higher level of beneﬁt morale (see Table3). Esti-
mated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering
by country-years) in parentheses below. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
b Coeﬃcients
are displayed in Figure1.
c Coeﬃcients are displayed in Figure2.
d Coeﬃcients are
displayed in Figure3.
e The base group is equal to employed individuals.Figure 1: Cohort eﬀects on beneﬁt morale
Figure 2: Period eﬀects on beneﬁt morale
26Figure 3: Income eﬀects on beneﬁt morale
27